International Scientific Series.
Volume LXXXIX.
(The International Scientific Series)
Edited by F. Legge
THE MIND AND THE BRAIN
by
ALFRED BINET
Directeur du Laboratoire de Psychologie
a la Sorbonne
Being the Authorised Translation of
_L'Ame et le Corps_
London
Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner & Co. Ltd
Dryden House, Gerrard Street, W.
1907
CONTENTS
BOOK I
THE DEFINITION OF MATTER
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between mind and matter--Knowable not
homogeneous--Criterion employed, enumeration not concepts
CHAPTER II
OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS ONLY SENSATION
Modern theories of matter--Outer world only known to us by our
sensations--Instances--Mill's approval of proposition, and its
defects--Nervous system only intermediary between self and outer
world--The great X of Matter--Nervous system does not give us true
image--Mueller's law of specificity of the nerves--The nervous system
itself a sensation--Relations of sensation with the unknowable the
affair of metaphysics
CHAPTER III
THE MECHANICAL THEORIES OF MATTER ARE ONLY SYMBOLS
Physicists vainly endeavour to reduce the role of
sensation--Mathematical, energetical, and mechanical theories of
universe--Mechanical model formed from sensation--Instance of
tuning-fork--No one sensation any right to hegemony over others
CHAPTER IV
ANSWERS TO SOME OBJECTIONS, AND SUMMARY
Objections of spiritualists--Of German authors who contend that
nervous system does give true image--Of metaphysicians--Common ground
of objection that nervous system not intermediary--Answer to
this--Summary of preceding chapters
BOOK II
THE DEFINITION OF MIND
CHAPTER I
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COGNITION AND ITS OBJECT
Necessity for inventory of mental phenomena--Objects of cognition and
acts of cognition--Definition of consciousness
CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF SENSATION