The Mind and the Brain

Play Audio | Get the Book | Del.icio.us

International Scientific Series.

Volume LXXXIX.

(The International Scientific Series)

Edited by F. Legge

THE MIND AND THE BRAIN

by

ALFRED BINET

Directeur du Laboratoire de Psychologie a la Sorbonne

Being the Authorised Translation of

_L'Ame et le Corps_

London Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner & Co. Ltd Dryden House, Gerrard Street, W. 1907

CONTENTS

BOOK I

THE DEFINITION OF MATTER

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The distinction between mind and matter--Knowable not homogeneous--Criterion employed, enumeration not concepts

CHAPTER II

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS ONLY SENSATION

Modern theories of matter--Outer world only known to us by our sensations--Instances--Mill's approval of proposition, and its defects--Nervous system only intermediary between self and outer world--The great X of Matter--Nervous system does not give us true image--Mueller's law of specificity of the nerves--The nervous system itself a sensation--Relations of sensation with the unknowable the affair of metaphysics

CHAPTER III

THE MECHANICAL THEORIES OF MATTER ARE ONLY SYMBOLS

Physicists vainly endeavour to reduce the role of sensation--Mathematical, energetical, and mechanical theories of universe--Mechanical model formed from sensation--Instance of tuning-fork--No one sensation any right to hegemony over others

CHAPTER IV

ANSWERS TO SOME OBJECTIONS, AND SUMMARY

Objections of spiritualists--Of German authors who contend that nervous system does give true image--Of metaphysicians--Common ground of objection that nervous system not intermediary--Answer to this--Summary of preceding chapters

BOOK II

THE DEFINITION OF MIND

CHAPTER I

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COGNITION AND ITS OBJECT

Necessity for inventory of mental phenomena--Objects of cognition and acts of cognition--Definition of consciousness

CHAPTER II

DEFINITION OF SENSATION

Sensation defined by experimental psychology--A state of consciousness--Considered self-evident by Mill, Renouvier, and Hume--Psycho-physical according to Reid and Hamilton--Reasons in favour of last definition--Other opinions examined and refuted

CHAPTER III

DEFINITION OF THE IMAGE

Perception and ideation cannot be separated--Perception constituted by addition of image to sensation--Hallucinations--Objections anticipated and answered

CHAPTER IV

DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS

Contrary opinions as to nature of emotions--Emotion a phenomenon _sui generis_--Intellectualist theory of emotion supported by Lange and James--Is emotion only a perception? Is effort?--Question left unanswered

CHAPTER V

DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE RELATION SUBJECT-OBJECT

Can thoughts be divided into subject and object?--This division cannot apply to the consciousness--Subject of cognition itself an object--James' opinion examined--Opinion that subject is spiritual substance and consciousness its faculty refuted

CHAPTER VI

DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--CATEGORIES OF THE UNDERSTANDING

Principle of relativity doubted--Tables of categories: Aristotle, Kant, and Renouvier--Kantian idealism--Phenomenism of Berkeley examined and rejected--Argument of _a priorists_--The intelligence only an inactive consciousness--Huxley's epiphenomenal consciousness--Is the consciousness necessary?--Impossibility of answering this question

CHAPTER VII

DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE SEPARABILITY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS FROM ITS OBJECT--DISCUSSION OF IDEALISM

Can the consciousness be separated from its object?--Idealists consider the object a modality of the consciousness and thus inseparable, from it--Futility of this doctrine--Object can exist without consciousness

CHAPTER VIII

DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE SEPARATION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS FROM ITS OBJECT--THE UNCONSCIOUS

Can ideas exist without consciousness?--No consciousness without an object--Can the consciousness die?--Enfeeblement of consciousness how accounted for--Doubling of consciousness in hysterics--Relations of physiological phenomena to consciousness--Consciousness cannot become unconscious and yet exist

Next Page